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This paper considers the e¤ects of complementarity in private pro-
duction between private and public inputs on optimal scal policy
under the objective of growth maximization. Using an endogenous
growth model with public nance and CES technology, it derives two
central results. First, it shows that with complementarity, growth-
maximizing scal policy is also a¤ected by preference parameters,
the degree of complementarity and the stock-ow properties of public
inputs to private production. Second, it shows that optimal public
spending composition and taxation are interrelated and also depend
on the e¢ ciency of public spending under growth maximization. Both
results contrast with standard ndings in the literature that are typi-
cally based on the assumption of Cobb-Douglas technology, and have
important lessons for policy settings.
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1 Introduction
The objective of this paper is to examine the e¤ects of complementarity be-
tween public and private inputs to private production on growth-maximizing
scal policy, within the context of an endogenous growth model.1 The role of
input complementarity for economic development is increasingly appreciated.
Early work by Kremer (1993), for example, argues that when private produc-
tion requires a range of complementary inputs, the failure of one can have
disastrous consequences (the so called O-ring-theory). More recently, Tem-
ple (2009) has suggested that growth determinants are complements rather
than substitutes, which can give rise to bottlenecks with a disproportionate
negative impact on growth. Similarly, Jones (2011) shows that large di¤er-
ences in TFP across countries can only plausibly be explained by comple-
mentarity of inputs to private production among other factors. By contrast,
the analysis of the e¤ects of complementarity for scal policy in the context
of growth models has received limited attention so far.
We develop a standard endogenous growth model with public nance
where the government is assumed to levy a at tax on income which distorts
private investment. Similar to Tsoukis and Miller (2003), Ghosh and Roy
(2004), and Agénor (2011) for example, we assume that the government
uses the proceeds from this tax to nance productive public services and
public capital which both enter private production thereby enhancing the
productivity of the private sector. In addition, we also consider the e¢ ciency
of public spending, as in Agénor (2010), and we model the production of
public services in greater detail similar to Agénor (2008b).
We then amend this framework by assuming that private and public in-
puts are complements through imposing a CES production function, contrary
to most existing papers which are based on a Cobb-Douglas framework. As-
1Endogenous growth models with a scal policy dimension, such as Barro (1990) and
Futagami et al. (1993), who derive growth-maximizing levels of taxation and public spend-
ing composition, have increasingly formed the basis for empirical investigation that scal
policy a¤ects long-run growth. See, for example, Acosta Ormaechea and Yoo (2012); Gem-
mell et al. (2012). Also, Arnold et al. (2011) examine tax composition e¤ects on long-run
GDP levels based on a augmented Solow model. This evidence conrms the predictions
of endogenous growth models with public nance.
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suming complementarity is in line with the notion that private inputs are
at best very imperfect substitutes for public inputs in the production of pri-
vate output. Devarajan et al. (1996) and Ghosh and Gregoriou (2008) are
among the few papers that present an endogenous growth model with public
nance based on CES technology. However, their models are not as rich as
that presented below and include only two scal policy parameters. These
previous CES-based models also ignore public capital and do not identify the
growth-maximizing scal policy.
In this paper, we focus on the implications of complementarity for s-
cal policy under growth maximization. For our purposes, considering growth
maximization is interesting because there is a standard, and relatively uncon-
troversial, nding in the existing literature when the simple, but potentially
unrealistic, case of Cobb-Douglas (C-D) technology is assumed. In the C-D
case, endogenous growth models with public nance imply that only the fac-
tor share parameters of the production function for nal output and, where
included, of public inputs determine the growth-maximizing tax rate, the
volume of public spending, and the growth-maximizing expenditure compo-
sition. As a result, the growth-maximizing levels of both the tax and public
spending policy parameters are independent of each other.
By allowing for CES production technology, we generate a number of
interesting results with respect to the optimal level and the optimal compo-
sition of public spending (under the objective of growth maximization) which
contrast with the equivalent case under C-D technology.2
First, we show numerically that CES technology implies that the number
of parameters that determine optimal scal policy under growth maximiza-
tion signicantly increases even though we leave all remaining features of the
model unchanged. With CES technology the growth-maximizing scal policy
is also determined by preference parameters, other technology parameters (in
addition to the share parameters), and the stock-ow properties of public in-
puts (which can be interpreted as the rate of depreciation of public capital).
2There are obviously di¤erences between growth- and welfare-maximizing scal policy.
However, Misch et al. (2013) show that di¤erences in outcomes in terms of growth and
welfare under growth and welfare maximization are nevertheless fairly small despite the
di¤erences in policies.
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These results suggest that the assumption of C-D technology understates
the complexity of the various factors determining growth-maximizing scal
policy in otherwise identical models.3 4
Second, again using numerical methods, we show that there are instances
where the growth-maximizing level of productive spending (which equals the
level of taxation) depends on its composition and vice versa. In particular,
we show that the optimal level of taxation is higher when the composition of
public spending is suboptimal; and that the optimal share of public resources
allocated to public investment may be very low when the level of taxation
deviates from its rst-best level. Similar results arise when public spending is
not e¢ cient. These are therefore additional, but simple and intuitive, cases
of second-best interaction in public nance that have largely been ignored in
the literature and that do not arise under C-D technology.
In practice, governments are likely to be constrained in their ability to
alter either total public spending or its mix, implying that such model predic-
tions may be relevant to the achievement of growth-maximizing scal policy
in practice as well. On the expenditure side, such constraints may arise as
a consequence of budget rigidities due, for example, to quasi-xed expendi-
ture items such as social welfare benets linked to entitlement conditions, or
interest payments that depend on the previously accumulated stock of pub-
lic debt.5 On the revenue side, such constraints may arise where there are
large informal sectors that keep tax revenue levels relatively low, as in some
developing countries. Frequently, these types of constraints can persist over
relatively long periods of time.
The advantage of assuming C-D technology in endogenous growth mod-
els with public nance is, of course, that closed-form solutions for growth-
3The result is also an obvious analogy to the theory of taxation which demonstrates
that even in simple static tax models, the optimal tax system depends on a wide range of
factors for which it may be di¢ cult to nd empirical counterparts even when a range of
simplifying assumptions is made (Creedy, 2009).
4Under welfare maximization, similar results may arise in the absence of CES technol-
ogy.
5Budget rigidities may signicantly constrain governments in practice: Mattina and
Gunnarsson (2007) for instance estimate that the share of spending that is non-exible
due to legal obligations (which includes social benets, interest payments, compensation
of public employees, and subsidies) amounts to 72% in Slovenia.
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maximizing scal policy exist. By contrast, closed-form solutions often can-
not be obtained when CES technology is assumed. For this reason, we are
forced to rely on numerical examples to derive our results. While the well-
known drawback of numerical examples is that they cannot establish the
generality of some results, they nevertheless serve the purpose of our paper.
In particular, they su¢ ce to show that under sensible parameter assump-
tions, the results with respect to growth-maximizing scal policy under C-D
technology cannot be generalized and may cease to hold at least in some
plausible cases.
Our model results have important implications for optimal scal policy
setting, and our framework suggests that commonly held beliefs about what
constitutes optimal scal policy under growth maximization may not be valid;
at least where complementarity in production technology is important. For
instance, our results suggest that with low levels of revenue collection (as in
many developing countries), optimal public investment under growth maxi-
mization is low relative to a situation where this is not the case - even if the
output elasticity of public capital di¤ers signicantly from zero. This result
contrasts with common beliefs about the importance of public investment for
long-run growth, but they are in principle consistent with Ghosh and Gre-
goriou (2008) who nd that reallocating public resources in favor of public
investment is growth-enhancing based on data from developing countries.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops
the model and derives the equilibrium of the market economy. Section 3
derives growth-maximizing scal policy with Cobb-Douglas technology as a
benchmark case. Sections 4 and 5 demonstrate the e¤ects of complementarity
on optimal scal policy under growth maximization. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Model
The public nance growth framework we adopt in the paper is based on De-
varajan et al. (1996). We extend their model by simultaneously considering
public services and public capital as in Tsoukis and Miller (2003), Ghosh and
Roy (2004), and in Agénor (2011) for example. We model the e¢ ciency of
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public spending as in Agénor (2010), and a production function for public
services in a similar way as Agénor (2008b) for example, together with CES
technology as in the original model by Devarajan et al. (1996). We assume
that there is a large number of innitely lived households and rms that is
normalized to one so that rm entry and exit cancel out, or are absent, and
population growth is zero.
The representative rm produces a single composite good using private
capital, k, broadly dened to encompass physical and human capital, and
two public inputs, G1 and G2, based on CES technology:
y = (k + 1G

1 + 2G

2)
1
 (1)
where , 1 and 2 are share parameters with  = 1 1 2. The productiv-
ity of private capital used by the individual rm therefore depends positively
on G1 and G2, which can be thought of as being provided by di¤erent govern-
ment sectors (e.g. education and transport infrastructure). Private vehicles,
for example, may be used more productively when the quality of the road
network increases. G1 and G2 are non-rival and provided free of charge to
the agents of the economy. The parameter  determines the elasticity of sub-
stitution which corresponds to 1
1  . With  = 0, the production technology
is Cobb-Douglas.6
G1 denotes the amount of productive public services provided by the
government (e.g. public law enforcement, public education services), whereas
G2 denotes the stock of public capital (e.g. public infrastructure) which the
government accumulates through public investment, _G2. In other words,
G1 can be interpreted as a public input to private production which fully
depreciates over one period, and G2 can be interpreted as a public input with
innite lifetime that does not depreciate at all. To capture the notion that
factors of production are complements rather than substitutes, it is assumed
that   0. This assumption seems justied when considering public inputs
provided by the government which di¤er fundamentally from private inputs,
6We recognize that a more general specication of (1) would be a nested CES function
that allows for di¤erent elasticities of substitution between G1 and G2 on the one hand
and between G1 and G2 taken together and private capital on the other. However, for the
purpose of this paper, our specication of the production function is su¢ cient.
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such that it may be very costly for rms to substitute private alternatives for
them. For instance, privately generating electricity is typically much more
expensive than using electricity from the public grid.
The government nances total public expenditure by levying a at tax,
 , on income, and the government budget is assumed to be always balanced.
We further assume that the technical e¢ ciency of public spending may vary.
For instance, ine¢ ciencies arise if the government purchases the inputs for
G1 and G2 at a high price, or if there is waste due to corrupt bureaucrats.
While changing the level of technical e¢ ciency may also involve a resource
cost, we refrain from modeling this in greater detail for simplicity because
this is not needed to derive our main results in later sections.
G1 itself is produced using two di¤erent inputs, GA and GB, which can be
interpreted as sub-sectoral public spending categories, based on CES tech-
nology:
G1 = (!G
"
A + G
"
B)
1
" (2)
with ! = 1    and where " determines the elasticity of substitution. This
feature of the model allows for a richer specication of scal policy because
the inter-sectoral allocation of public resources (between G1 and G2), and
the sub-sectoral allocation of public resources (between GA and GB) can
be distinguished. It allows us to analyze the e¤ects of misallocation at the
sub-sectoral level on the growth-maximizing tax rate and the inter-sectoral
composition below. Analogously to the production of nal output, we assume
that "  0, reecting the notion that GA and GB, are complements. For
simplicity, we set " =  which facilitates the derivation of the results but does
not change them qualitatively. GA may represent, for example, the amount
of goods and services, and GB represent spending on public administration,
within the production of G1.7
Let 1 (2) determine the inter-sectoral allocation of public resources
7In addition, it would also be possible to model the production of public capital in
greater detail. For simplicity, we refrain from this as our purpose is to show that the
sub-sectoral allocation of public resources inuences the growth-maximizing values of the
tax rate and of the inter-sectoral allocation which we show further below. Obviously, the
allocation of resources among di¤erent inputs to public capital is also likely to matter, but
we do not pursue this here.
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and denote the share of total public expenditure that is allocated to G1 ( _G2)
with 1+2 = 1 (i.e., the share of resources allocated to public investment is
2 = 1 1) and let A (B) denote the share of public spending on G1 that
is allocated to GA (GB) with A+B = 1. Further, let 1 and 2 denote the
technical e¢ ciency of public spending on G1 and G2 which we assume to be
di¤erent from the allocative e¢ ciency. Gj (with j = A;B) can therefore be
written as
Gj = 11jy (3)
Using (2) and (3), the amount of G1 can therefore be written as
G1 = 11(!
"
A + 
"
B)
1
" y (4)
The level of public investment, _G2, can be written as
_G2 = 22y (5)
We normalize ki so that at ki = 1 (with i = 1; 2), public spending is assumed
to be perfectly e¢ cient in a technical sense. For simplicity, we assume that
increasing the e¢ ciency of public spending is possible at no cost (i.e. in-
creasing ki does not involve a trade-o¤). While in principle, this means that
governments would never choose any value for ki below one in the absence of
constraints, this assumption merely serves as a simplication and allows us
to address the hypothetical question of what would happen if public spend-
ing was not perfectly e¢ cient. However, to capture the notion that e¢ ciency
gains are limited, we assume that 1  1 and that 2  1.
The households own the rms and therefore receive all their output net
of taxation which they either reinvest in the rms to increase their capital
stock or use for consumption, depending on their preferences and the returns
to private capital. Private investment by the representative household equals
_k = (1  )y   c (6)
The representative household chooses the consumption path to maximize
lifetime utility U given by
U =
Z 1
0

c1 
1  

e tdt (7)
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subject to the households resource constraint given by (6) taking  , G1, G2
and k0 > 0 as given.8 From the rst-order conditions, the growth rate of
the households consumption, and of the economy, can be written in familiar
form as
 =
_c
c
=
1

((1  )yk   ) (8)
In order to ensure that the transversality condition holds and does not con-
strain the choice of  and 1;2, it is assumed that  > 1.
9
Along the balanced growth path, output can be expressed as
y =
_y

(9)
Using (9) to substitute for y in (5), and integrating, yields
G2 =
22

y (10)
For the remainder of this section, we assume Cobb-Douglas technology
to simplify the analytical expressions. Hence, when  = 0 (and " = 0), the
production function can then be written as:
y = kG11 G
2
2 (11)
where  = 1  1   2. The marginal product of capital, yk, can be written
as:
yk = 

G1
y
1 G2
y
2 y
k
1+2
(12)
Using (4), (10) and (11) to substitute for G1=y, G2=y and y=k in (12), and
using (12) to substitute for yk in (8) yields:
 =
1

 
(1  )

(1A)
! (1B)
 11
1


(22)
1

2

  
!
(13)
8The time subscript is omitted whenever possible. A dot over the variable denotes its
derivative with respect to time. The initial stock of public capital must also be greater
than zero.
9The transversality condition can be written as lim
t!1[k] = 0 where  is the costate
variable of the current-value Hamiltonian.
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Note that (13) is not a nalexpression for the growth rate but merely an
equation that the growth rate must satisfy because  also appears on the
RHS.
The Appendix shows that the equilibrium of the model is saddlepoint
stable within relevant parameter ranges, and that the balanced growth path
is unique. Along the balanced growth path, c, k, G1, G2 and y all grow at
the same rate.
3 Optimal Fiscal Policy with Cobb-Douglas
Technology under Growth Maximization
This section derives optimal scal policy when output (y) and public services
(G1) are produced using Cobb-Douglas technology under the objective of
growth maximization. This benchmark case will allow us to demonstrate the
role of complementarity in later sections.
For simplicity, we assume throughout the paper that the objective of
the government is to maximize growth in contrast to papers that derive
the welfare-maximizing scal policy in similar frameworks as Ghosh and Roy
(2004) for example. While in these models, growth and welfare maximization
are not identical, in practice, growth maximization is less complex and more
common as changes in output are easier to observe than welfare. In addition,
the di¤erences in outcomes between growth and welfare maximization in
similar models often appear to be small (see Misch et al., 2013). Below we
use the term optimalscal policy to refer to the growth-maximizing values
of the tax rate and of the public spending shares of public services and public
investment (denoted by   and 1;2, respectively).
Cobb-Douglas technology implies  = " = 0. Since the model is based on
the assumption that there is no cost to increased e¢ ciency, the government
sets k1;2 at their maximum values 1;2 to ensure that public spending is fully
e¢ cient:
1;2 = 1 (14)
(which obviously maximizes growth and welfare, and which does not depend
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on the underlying production technology). Implicitly di¤erentiating (13)
yields the growth-maximizing income tax rate,  , which corresponds to:
  = 1 + 2 (15)
and the growth-maximizing inter-sectoral expenditure shares, 1;2, which cor-
respond to
1;2 =
1;2
1 + 2
(16)
where 1+

2 = 1. Further, the growth-maximizing sub-sectoral expenditure
shares within G1, 

A;B, correspond to
A = ! (17)
and
B =  (18)
Hence (15), (16), (17) and (18) suggest that with Cobb-Douglas technology,
the growth-maximizing tax rate and expenditure shares depend only on share
parameters of the production functions of nal output and of public services.
These results correspond to those derived in the existing literature: for exam-
ple, Agénor (2008a), Agénor (2008b) and Tsoukis and Miller (2003). They
are also directly implied by Barro (1990) and Futagami et al. (1993) who
rst presented endogenous growth models with productive public services
and public capital, respectively.
One implication of these results is that the optimal level of taxation, the
optimal public spending composition, and the e¢ ciency of public spending
are not interrelated. This means for instance that   also represents the opti-
mal level of taxation if 1;2 6= 1;2 and 1;2 < 1. By contrast, we demonstrate
below that this does not necessarily hold under CES technology.
4 Optimal Fiscal Policy with Complementar-
ity under Growth Maximization
This section introduces CES technology to the derivation of optimal scal
policy under growth maximization. Given that no closed-form solutions are
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feasible, we now use numerical examples to analyze whether the growth-
maximizing scal policy parameters are responsive to changes in various ex-
ogenous model parameters which play no role under C-D technology (i.e.
they do not enter (15), (16), (17) and (18)).
Figure 1 plots the growth-maximizing tax rate,  , the growth-maximizing
expenditure share of total government revenue allocated to G1, 

1, and the
growth-maximizing sub-sectoral share of resources allocated to GA, A, as a
function of  (which determines the elasticity of substitution). The slopes
deviate from zero, and Figure 1 suggests that   and 1;2 are highly sensitive
to the choice of the elasticity of substitution. In addition, with  < 0,
the stock-ow properties of the public inputs also impact on the growth-
maximizing scal policy. This can be seen by noting that even though 2
(the share parameter associated withG2) exceeds 1, the optimal expenditure
share 1 may exceed 0.5 (and hence 

2) when  < 0. In contrast, when Cobb-
Douglas technology is assumed and when 2 > 1, (16) implies that 

2 > 

1
always holds. This is one example of potentially misleading implications
of assuming Cobb-Douglas technology. The intuition here is that the level
of G2 (a stock variable) is typically higher than the level of G1 (which is
only derived from the ow of public spending). With complementarity, it is
then optimal to increase the share of public resources allocated to G1 and to
increase overall public revenue through higher taxation. Both measures serve
to increase the level of G1. In contrast, the optimal sub-sectoral allocation
represented by A does not respond to exogenous changes in  because GA
and GB are both associated with the ow of public spending.
Figures 2 and 3 plot the growth-maximizing tax rate,  , and the growth-
maximizing expenditure shares, 1 and 

A, as a function of  (which de-
termines the households inter-temporal elasticity of substitution) and the
discount rate parameter . Again, the slopes are non-zero, and it can be
seen that with CES technology, both preference parameters determine  
and 1. While Figures 2 and 3 suggest that the sensitivity of 
 and 1
to changes in  and  is limited - the slope is not steep - nevertheless this
non-zero result is novel.
Under welfare maximization it seems plausible that household preferences
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would a¤ect optimal scal policy. However, under growth maximization, this
is less intuitive because, with growth maximization, scal policy only directly
impacts on private production and income (and not utility). Intuitively, this
result follows directly from the model assumptions of complementarity and
the fact that the government accumulates public capital.
Complementarity essentially implies that in addition to the share para-
meters of the production function and the cost of generating public revenue,
it is the level of private capital which determines the optimal level of the
public inputs. However, the government is unable to manipulate the stock of
public capital directly because unlike public services, it is not derived from
the ow of public spending but rather accumulated over time similarly to
private capital. The growth-maximizing rate of public investment therefore
depends on the rate of private investment which, in turn, can be shown to
depend on preference parameters. This ensures that the level of public cap-
ital depends on the level of private capital as dictated by complementarity.
By contrast, the optimal sub-sectoral allocation represented by A does not
respond to exogenous changes in  and . Thus the allocation of public re-
sources between the two public services depends solely on share parameters
in the production function even with CES technology.
These results stress that even within simple models and under the sim-
plifying assumption of growth maximization as the government objective,
CES technology signicantly changes the nature and determinants of growth-
maximizing policy. In particular, the results show that Cobb-Douglas tech-
nology understates the complexity of growth-maximizing scal policy in the
sense that it suggests that growth-maximizing scal policy is only determined
by particular production technology parameters.
12
Figure 1: Optimal scal policy as a function of 
5 Optimal Fiscal Policy with Complementar-
ity under Growth Maximization and Con-
straints on Government
This section considers the case when governments are constrained in their
ability to alter either total public spending or its mix, due, for example, to
quasi-xed expenditure items such as social welfare benets linked to entitle-
ment conditions, interest payments that depend on the previously accumu-
lated stock of public debt, or wages of public employees. On the revenue side,
similar constraints may arise due to the di¢ culties governments in develop-
ing countries experience in taxing large informal sectors, which then limits
governmentsability to increase public revenue levels. Given the nature of
the underlying legal, economic and political causes of such constraints, it
seems plausible to model them as persisting into the long run. In some ways,
this assumption is similar to that of García Peñalosa and Turnovsky (2005)
who show that enforcement problems, as an alternative constraint on the
governments budget, alter optimal scal policy.10
10Standard although implicit constraints that are often imposed on governments in
endogenous growth models with public nance include the assumptions that lump-sum
13
Figure 2: Optimal scal policy as a function of 
Here, we assume that these constraints limit the ability of governments
to set scal policy parameters optimally; for simplicity, we model this as
the government being unable to adjust one or more scal policy parameters,
which is then exogenously given. We consider four distinct situations; in
each of them one of the four types of scal policy parameters in the model
is exogenously given and cannot be adjusted by the government due to such
constraints. The four parameters we distinguish are: the technical e¢ ciency
of public spending determined by i, the rate of taxation  , the inter-sectoral
allocative e¢ ciency determined by i, and the sub-sectoral e¢ ciency of public
spending determined by j.
In the rst three cases, we abstract from sub-sectoral allocation within
G1 and set  = 0 and A = 1 for simplicity. In scenario 1, the technical
e¢ ciency of public spending on G1 is xed at 1 < 1, whereas  and 1;2 are
freely adjustable. In scenario 2, the level of taxation is exogenously given and
possibly suboptimal so that  6=   whereas public spending is fully e¢ cient
(1;2 = 1) in a technical sense given that there is no cost to raise e¢ ciency,
and the government sets the expenditure shares 1;2 optimally. In scenario 3,
taxation is not available and that economic agents take taxes and public spending as
given.
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Figure 3: Optimal scal policy as a function of 
the expenditure shares of G1 and G2 in total public revenue are exogenously
given and possibly suboptimal so that 1;2 6= 1;2 whereas public spending
is fully e¢ cient in a technical sense (1;2 = 1) and  is freely adjustable. In
scenario 4, we set 0 <  < 1 and assume that the sub-sectoral expenditure
shares of GA and GB in spending on G1 are exogenously given and possibly
suboptimal so that A;B 6= A;B whereas public spending is fully e¢ cient
(1;2 = 1) in a technical sense and  as well as 1;2 are freely adjustable.
As discussed above, (15) and (16) imply that under Cobb-Douglas tech-
nology, the growth-maximizing tax rate   and the growth-maximizing ex-
penditure shares 1;2 and 

A;B are independent of each other in the sense
that deviations from the growth-maximizing tax rate have no impact on
the growth-maximizing spending shares and vice versa. In addition, the
sub-sectoral public resource allocations and the technical e¢ ciency of public
spending neither a¤ect the optimal taxation nor the optimal inter-sectoral
public spending composition.
With CES technology, these results fundamentally change even in these
simplied cases: the optimal tax rate and expenditure shares in the absence
of constraints on government which we refer to as rst-best,   and 1;2, are
not necessarily identical to their optimal values in the presence of constraints
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referred to as second-bestand denoted by   and 1;2, respectively. As
closed-form solutions for the optimal policy parameters are not available
with public capital, public services and CES production technology for the
market economy, we again resort to numerical examples to show that the
value of   (1 ) is responsive to changes in 1;2, 1 and A (to changes in
1;2,  and A). Figures 4, 5, 6 and 7 represent the four distinct scenarios
described above.
Figure 4 captures scenario 1 and plots the second-best values of  and
1;2 as a function of the e¢ ciency parameter 1 which is exogenously given
and which varies between 0.5 and 1. It demonstrates that when 1 < 1,
the second-best tax rate,  , and the optimal share of resources allocated
to G1, 

1 , exceed the rst-best tax rate, 
, and the rst-best value of 1,
1, respectively. The intuition is that with complementarity of the inputs to
private production, higher levels of taxation and increased resources allocated
to G1 serve to compensate for low public spending e¢ ciency and thereby
prevent the levels of G1 from falling ine¢ ciently low. This is a standard
second-best result: replicating rst-best policies in a second-best situation
may not be optimal. It can also be shown that the growth rate is still lower
and does not attain its rst-best value.
Figure 5 is based on scenario 2 and plots the second-best value of 1,
1 , as a function of  which is exogenous and varies between 0 and 1 so
that it may deviate from  . It likewise demonstrates that when  6=  ,
the optimal share of public resources allocated to G1 (the optimal share of
public resources allocated to public investment, _G2) exceeds (falls short of)
the one in rst-best situation; hence 1 > 

1 (

2 < 

2). The intuition is as
follows. G2 represents the stock of public capital. Current public spending
only a¤ects the additions to the stock of capital and but not the existing
stock of public capital. When  <   and 1 = 

1, G1 drops relatively more
than G2.
With complementarity, it is then e¢ cient to allocate a larger share of
public resources to G1 to mitigate the decrease in overall public resources
available. In the opposite case, when  >   and 1 = 

1, the intuition is
less clear. Given the increase of public resources, the levels of G1 and of G2
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are higher compared to the rst-best situation. However, as G2 is a stock
variable, G2 is higher than G1. With complementarity between G1 and G2,
it is hence e¢ cient to allocate a greater share of public resources to G1 so
that 1 > 

1.
Figure 6 is based on scenario 3 and plots the second-best value of  ,  ,
as a function of 1 which assumes values between 0 and 1 so that it may
deviate from 1. It likewise demonstrates that when 1 6= 1, the growth-
maximizing level of taxation exceeds that in a rst-best situation; hence   >
 . The intuition is similar to scenario 1 when 1 is set below one. Under
misallocation of public resources at the sectoral level, the overall e¤ectiveness
of public spending decreases. With complementarity between private and
public inputs, it is e¢ cient to compensate for this decrease by increasing the
level of taxation (and thereby the level of total public spending).
Figure 7 illustrates scenario 4 and plots the second-best values,   and
1 , as a function of A which is exogenously given. It demonstrates that
under misallocation of resources at the sub-sectoral level (A 6= A), the
growth-maximizing level of taxation and the growth-maximizing share of
resources allocated toG1 exceed those in a rst-best situation (hence   >  
and 1 > 

1). The intuition is similar to scenario 1: with sub-sectoral
misallocation, the supply level of G1 falls. With complementarity between
private and public inputs, it is e¢ cient to compensate for this decrease by
increasing the resources available for spending on G1 through higher taxation
and through reallocation between G1 and G2.
These results demonstrate that under CES technology with complemen-
tary factor inputs, constraints on government have important implications
for optimal scal policy under growth maximization that di¤er from the
Cobb-Douglas case. With regard to optimal taxation and public spending
composition, second-best scal policy parameters may signicantly deviate
from their rst-best values.
In our model, public capital may be thought of as representing public
infrastructure which is commonly assumed to play an important role in the
process of economic development. However, even if the share parameter
of public capital in private production signicantly di¤ers from zero (i.e.,
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2 > 0), the optimal share of public resources allocated to public capital
(2 = 1   1) in situations with constraints may still be relatively small
relative to 2 or even close to zero as shown in Figure 5 depending on the
rate of taxation which determines the level of public spending. In addition,
the share of public resources allocated to public investment depends on the
sub-sectoral allocation of public resources within the production of public
services (G1) as demonstrated in Figure 7.
Our results contrast with those of existing papers which do not examine
the impact of constraints on government in combination with complementar-
ity on growth-maximizing scal policy. The results of Ghosh and Roy (2004)
are closest to ours and imply that in a model with Cobb-Douglas technology,
public capital and public services, the optimal tax rate depends on the com-
position of public spending and vice versa under welfare maximization. By
contrast, this paper considers growth maximization, which is not discussed
in detail by Gosh and Roy (2004). They also do not analyze optimal scal
policy where either the tax rate or the composition of public spending is not
set at rst-best levels, which makes their results di¢ cult to compare with
ours.
Figure 4: Optimal scal policy as a function of 1
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Figure 5: Optimal scal policy as a function of 
6 Conclusions
This paper has extended standard endogenous growth models with public
nance by allowing for input complementarity via CES technology. It has
shown that key implications of this class of models with respect to opti-
mal scal policy under growth maximization are not robust to these small
changes in the underlying assumptions. On the one hand, CES technology
implies that the number of model parameters that determine the growth-
maximizing scal policy signicantly increases in otherwise identical models
and that preference parameters, the degree of complementarity and the stock-
ow properties of public inputs to private production become determinants.
On the other hand, the optimal values of the level of taxation and the
composition of public spending are interrelated in the CES case, which is
important if the government is constrained in its ability to set one of these
parameters optimally. For instance, the optimal share of public investment
falls when the level of taxation is not set to its rst-best level as a result of con-
straints. A natural extension would be to derive the welfare-maximizing scal
policy within the same framework and compare the results to the growth-
maximizing equivalent which we leave for future research.
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Figure 6: Optimal scal policy as a function of 1
To demonstrate these results, the paper relies on numerical examples.
Such an approach is restrictive compared to more general closed-form ana-
lytical solutions. Though we have chosen admittedly simple parameter con-
gurations, we would argue that these represent plausible parameter ranges.
Further, they serve the purpose of this paper; namely, to show that the model-
based conclusions with respect to growth-maximizing scal policy that are
drawn from models with Cobb-Douglas technology cannot be generalized.
Our primary aim has been to reassess the robustness of the ndings of
endogenous growth models with respect to the nature of growth-maximizing
scal policy. Our model is therefore highly stylized but could be extended
in future research, for instance by endogenizing labor-leisure choices. While
we cannot rule out the possibility that in a more complex model, input
complementarity would once again have no e¤ects on growth-maximizing
scal policy (so that the scal policy implications of CES and C-D technology
would coincide), our results suggest that such e¤ects are likely to be present
with CES technology, and that at least some of such complementarities could
be qualitatively and quantitatively important.
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Figure 7: Optimal scal policy as a function of A
A Appendix
A.1 Uniqueness and Stability of the Balanced Growth
Path
Let x = c
k
and z = G2
k
. Together with the transversality condition, lim
t!1
[k] =
0, and with the initial conditions, x0 > 0 and z0 > 0, the dynamics of the
market economy can be expressed as a system of two di¤erential equations
(we assume that i = 1):
_x
x
=
_c
c
 
_k
k
(A.1)
and
_z
z
=
_G2
G2
 
_k
k
(A.2)
From (8), (6) and (5), respectively,
_c
c
=
1

((1  )yk   ) (A.3)
_k
k
= (1  )y
k
  x (A.4)
_G2
G2
= 2
y
G2
(A.5)
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Setting _x
x
= 0 in (A.1) and solving for x yields its steady state value, ~x:
~x = (1  )y
k
  1

((1  )yk   ) (A.6)
Using (A.6) to substitute for x in (A.4), and using (A.4) and (A.5) to sub-
stitute for _k
k
and _G2
G2
in (A.2) yields
F = 2
y
G2
  1

(1  )yk + 

(A.7)
From (4) and (10),
G1
G2
=
1
2
 (A.8)
From (1) and (A.8),
y
G2
= (z  + 1

1
2


+ 2)
1
 (A.9)
Di¤erentiating (1) for k, using (4) to substitute for G1 and replacing G2k by
z yields
yk =

 + 1

1
y
k

+ 2z

 1

 1
 (A.10)
From (1) and (4),
y
k
=

 + 2z

(1  11)
 1

(A.11)
After using (A.11) to substitute in (A.10) and (A.9) and (A.10) to substitute
in (A.7), it can be seen that if   0, dF
dz
< 0 implying that F is a monoton-
ically decreasing function of z so that there is a unique positive value of ~z
that satises F = 0. From (A.6), there is a unique positive value of ~x as well.
Thus, the growth path is unique.
To investigate the dynamics in the vicinity of the unique steady state
equilibrium, equations (A.1) and (A.2) can be linearized to yield
_x
_z

=

a11 a12
a21 a22
 
x  ~x
z   ~z

(A.12)
where ~x and ~z denote the steady state values of x and z. From (A.1) and
(A.2), _x and _z can be rewritten as follows:
_x =
 
_c
c
 
_k
k
!
~x (A.13)
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and
_z =
 
_G2
G2
 
_k
k
!
~z (A.14)
with _c
c
, _k
k
and _G2
G2
dened according to (A.3), (A.4) and (A.5). Saddlepoint
stability requires that the determinant of the Jacobian matrix of partial deriv-
atives of the dynamic system (A.12) must be negative:
det J = a11a22   a12a21 (A.15)
Given the complexity of the matrix, it is easier to verify numerically that this
condition holds. For most sensible examples with sensible parameter values
that we used, this condition is satised.
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